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The Nature of the Form: Legal and Regulatory Issues
Surrounding the Bitcoin Digital Currency System
We are at the beginning of a mighty struggle for control of the
Internet—the web links everything and very soon it will mediate
most human activity—because the Internet has fashioned a new and
complicated environment for an age-old dilemma that pits the
demands of security with the desire for freedom.1
INTRODUCTION
Technology experts have described Bitcoin as a “masterpiece of
technology”—a work of genius on par with the Mona Lisa.2 Its
beauty, though, is not outwardly apparent but instead lies at the heart
of its design. Bitcoin is a digital currency system created to facilitate
Internet commerce. It does this by using digital signatures and peerto-peer technology to curtail the system’s need for trusted third
parties, such as financial intermediaries and central banks.3 Bitcoin’s
architecture gives it several advantages over alternative payment
systems: transaction costs are lower, privacy is enhanced, and
inflationary pressures within the system should be reduced.4
“Currency . . . is exactly like religion. It’s based entirely on
faith.”5 This is especially the case with Bitcoin; no government,
corporation, or commodity (like gold) backs the digital currency.6
Practically, however, it is not very different from established fiat

Copyright 2013, by JOSHUA J. DOGUET.
1. Presentation, Misha Glenny, Hire the Hackers!, TED (Sept. 2011),
available at http://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/ted-global-misha-glenny-says-hirehackers-091511.
2. Ari Altstedter, Bitcoins Create Truly Democratic Policy, Followers Say,
CANADA.COM (Jul. 22, 2011) (on file with author) (quoting IT consultant, Bruce
Wagner) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System,
BITCOIN.ORG, 1–2, 4 (2008), http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. See discussion infra
Part I.B.1–2.
4. Id. at 1, 6; Andy Greenberg, Crypto Currency, FORBES (May 9, 2011),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2011/0509/technology-psilocybin-bitcoins-gavinandresen-crypto-currency.html. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
5. Matthew Yeomans, The Quest for a Global E-Currency, CNN (Sept. 28,
1999), http://articles.cnn.com/1999-09-28/tech/9909_28_global.e.currency.idg_1
_credit-card-debit-global-internet-project/3 (quoting Jack Weatherford, author of
THE HISTORY OF MONEY).
6. Video, Bitcoin & the End of State-Controlled Money: Q&A with Jerry
Brito, REASON.COM, http://reason.tv/video/show/jerry-brito-on-bitcoin (last visited
Oct. 5, 2011).
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currencies.7 Bitcoin’s value fluctuates with respect to the value of
other currencies, and Bitcoins can be spent anywhere a merchant is
willing to accept them.8
In 2008, an enigmatic programmer, known only as Satoshi
Nakamoto, first proposed the idea for Bitcoin on a cryptography
email list.9 Early the following year, he published the open-source
software that implemented his system online.10 Since then, a
growing community of developers has maintained the software,
which has been downloaded hundreds of thousands of times by
individuals all over the world.11 At one point, Bitcoin attained a
circulation worth approximately $100 million.12
Bitcoin’s positive attributes should make it attractive to
consumers and merchants.13 If it attains a critical mass with both
groups, it could one day become a mainstream currency.14 In fact, as
a result of the increased access our society has to networked
technology, some have intimated that the use of private, digital
7. “Fiat money . . . [is] not redeemable for any commodity; its status as
money is conferred initially by the government but eventually by common
experience.” WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, ECONOMICS: A CONTEMPORARY
INTRODUCTION 732 (6th ed. 2003).
8. Paul Krugman, Golden Cyberfetters, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2011, 12:20
AM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/07/golden-cyberfetters; Bitcoin
Has Got Geeks Excited. What About Economists?, THE ECONOMIST, Jun. 18,
2011, at 83, available at http://www.economist.com/node/18836780. This aspect
of Bitcoin gives it an advantage over digital, community currencies that can only
be used within the community that created them, such as Second Life’s Linden
Dollars, Facebook Credits, and World of Warcraft Gold. Reuben Grinberg,
Bitcoin: An Innovative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159, 171–
72 (2012). See discussion infra Part III.A.
9. It is likely that the programmer’s name is actually a pseudonym. Tom
Simonite, What Bitcoin Is, and Why It Matters, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (May
25, 2011), http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/37619. The idea at the
core of the Bitcoin system actually comes from “a concept called crypto-currency,
which was first described in 1998 by Wei Dai.” About Bitcoin, BITCOIN.ORG,
http://bitcoin.org/about.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2011).
10. Simonite, supra note 9.
11. About Bitcoin, supra note 9 (listing developers that have contributed to
the Bitcoin software); Download Statistics: Bitcoin, SOURCEFORGE, http:
//sourceforge.net/projects/bitcoin/files/Bitcoin/stats/timeline?dates=2010-09-22
+to+2011-09-22 (last visited Sept. 20, 2011).
12. Thomas Lowenthal, Bitcoin: Inside the Encrypted, Peer-to-Peer Digital
Currency, ARS TECHNICA, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/06/bit
coin-inside-the-encrypted-peer-to-peer-currency.ars (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).
As of April 10, 2013, “the value of all outstanding Bitcoins is a bit less than $3
billion.” Timothy B. Lee, Nobody Knows If There’s a Bitcoin Bubble, FORBES
(Apr. 10, 2013, 12:09 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timothylee/2013/04
/10/nobody-knows-if-bitcoin-is-a-bubble.
13. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 160. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
14. Altstedter, supra note 2.
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currencies may prove to be the norm in the future. Even their limited
success could have a substantial impact on the fate of more
traditional currencies.15
The Bitcoin system itself is still in the early stages of
development.16 Its massive growth in a relatively short timeframe
may predominantly be credited to the excitement it has given geeks
and libertarians.17 The partial anonymity provided by the system,
however, has led to a concern that the currency will be increasingly
used for criminal purposes.18 Additionally, Bitcoin’s lack of
government oversight also gives way to another troublesome aspect
of the system: a lack of consumer safeguards.19 As one might
conclude, where large sums of money flow, legal consequences are
sure to follow.20
While Bitcoin is certainly not the first digital currency to gain
traction online,21 its innovative architecture is sure to make direct
regulation impractical.22 Even though Bitcoin raises a number of
concerns that its community cannot fully address, a complete
prohibition on its use would be a rash and ineffective response.23
Ultimately, regulatory efforts directed at Bitcoin exchanges would
best serve the interests of lawmakers.24 However, due to the
international nature of both the system and its actors, such controls
may only be successful at the domestic level.25

15. Jennifer L. Schenker, The Future of Money, INFORMILO (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.informilo.com/20120123/future-money-488; Simonite, supra note 9.
16. Scott Thill, Bitcoin: A New Kind of Money That’s Beyond the Reach of
Bankers, Wall St., and Regulators?, GUERNICA (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www
.guernicamag.com/blog/2941/scott_thill_bitcoin_a_new_kind.
17. Schenker, supra note 15. See discussion infra Part III.A.
18. Cindy Cohn, EFF and Bitcoin, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Jun.
20, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/06/eff-and-bitcoin. See discussion
infra Part III.A.
19. Id. See discussion infra Part III.B.
20. F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92
CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2004).
21. WebMoney, E-Gold, Pecunix, and Liberty Reserve are digital currencies
that are based on, or backed by, the price of gold. Peter C. Tucker, The Digital
Currency Doppelganger: Regulatory Challenge or Harbinger of the New
Economy?, 17 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 589, 598 (2009). Flooz and Beenz
were corporate-backed digital currencies that failed during the “dot-com bust” due
to lack of consumer interest. Mark W. Vigoroso, Beenz.com Closes Internet
Currency Business, E-COMMERCE TIMES (Aug. 17, 2001, 6:39 PM), http://www
.ecommercetimes.com/story/12892.html.
22. See discussion infra Part IV.
23. See discussion infra Part IV.A, C.
24. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
25. Id.
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Part I of this Comment looks at the specific shortcomings of the
current financial system, which prompted Bitcoin’s development. It
then explains how Bitcoin’s architecture enables it to overcome
these shortcomings. Part II reviews the legal barriers that private
currencies face and analyze how they might apply to Bitcoin. Part
III provides an overview of the Bitcoin economy by examining its
participants and discussing the hurdles it must overcome if it is ever
to become a mainstream currency. Part IV evaluates the motivations
behind, and the merits of, three regulatory regimes, and also
considers the Bitcoin community’s likely response.26
I. THE FUTURE OF COMMERCE?
A. The Costs of Trust
Between his self-published whitepaper and forum posts
describing the Bitcoin system’s technical underpinnings, Nakamoto
made his motivations for creating the currency clear: the removal of
trusted third parties.27 While third parties, like central banks and
financial intermediaries, often perform valuable services in
regulating and transferring currency, their presence in the system
increases the cost of using it.28
Central banks are government institutions that, among other
things, are responsible for their nations’ money supply.29 In effect,
26. While this Comment’s primary focus is the Bitcoin system, its
applicability is not so limited in scope. Taking into account the daily volatility of
the Bitcoin economy, in addition to the recent security vulnerabilities that have
troubled major market participants, the currency could go belly-up at any moment.
Such a development, however, is of little concern to this Comment’s analysis; the
regulatory issues discussed herein are just as important to Bitcoin’s progeny as
they are to the Bitcoin system itself. Its two-and-a-half-year history has at least
demonstrated that decentralized currencies are technologically feasible and likely
here to stay. Noam Cohen, Speed Bumps on the Road to Virtual Cash, N.Y. TIMES
(Jul. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/04/business/media/04link.html;
Daniel Lyons, The Web’s Secret Cash, THE DAILY BEAST (Jun. 19, 2011),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/06/19/the-web-s-secret-cash.html.
27. Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 1; Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin Open Source
Implementation of P2P Currency, P2P FOUNDATION (Feb. 11, 2009, 10:27 PM),
http://p2pfoundation.ning.com/forum/topics/bitcoin-open-source.
28. Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 1, 4. In this context, cost is used in a broad
sense not only to include the increased financial expense of the system, but also
the inconvenience and uncertainty that it entails. Additionally, many of the
motivations behind Bitcoin’s creation were also at work in bringing about the
development of its digital currency predecessors.
29. That is, the quantity of money that circulates in the economy. FREDERIC S.
MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 248,
G-7 (8th ed. 2007).
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the populace places a significant amount of trust in these institutions
to make sound policy decisions that are detached from political
influence and provide for stable economic growth.30 Their track
records, however, are not perfect.
Central banks’ decisions to engage in overly expansionary
monetary policy run the risk of creating high levels of inflation,
thereby decreasing the nations’ spending power.31 While the United
States’ own central bank, the Federal Reserve (the Fed), may take this
action to redistribute wealth, reduce unemployment, or finance
deficits, “virtually no limit exists with respect to what [it] can do with
the nation’s money supply.”32 In fact, history is replete with examples
of monetary policy spiraling out of control, often at the will of
governments that would rather finance their expenditures by printing
money, instead of, for instance, raising taxes.33 Furthermore, central
banks often rely on economic indicators and principles to guide their
policy decisions; a misinterpretation of—or rigid reliance upon—
either of the two can have particularly disastrous consequences.34
In addition to central banks, the market relies on financial
intermediaries, such as banks, credit card companies, and electronic
payment processors, to serve as trusted third parties between the
participants in an online transaction.35 The cost of using these
30. Michael D. Bordo, A Brief History of Central Banks, FED. RESERVE BANK
(Dec. 1, 2007), http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary
/2007/12.cfm.
31. MISHKIN, supra note 29, at 393; MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, AMERICA’S
GREAT DEPRESSION 7 (5th ed. 2000), available at http://mises.org/rothbard
/agd.pdf.
32. Lewis D. Solomon, Local Currency: A Legal & Policy Analysis, 5 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65–66 (1996). Some scholars have argued that the Federal
Reserve’s misuse of monetary policy has contributed to the current financial crisis.
John B. Taylor, The Fed and the Crisis: A Reply to Ben Bernanke, WALL STREET
J. (Jan. 10, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487034810045
74646100272016422.html.
33. Germany experienced massive hyperinflation in the years following
World War I, the rate of which ultimately exceeded one million percent and led to
the collapse of its currency. Though not nearly as severe, the Latin American
countries of Peru, Brazil, and Argentina each underwent a period of rapid inflation
between 1980 and 1990. More recently, Zimbabwe’s own problems with
hyperinflation necessitated the production of banknotes with face values of $100
trillion. Their currency, too, was eventually abandoned. MISHKIN, supra note 29,
at 614–15; Chris Bowlby, The Fear of Printing Too Much Money, BBC NEWS
(Mar. 5, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7925981.stm.
34. MISHKIN, supra note 29, at 408; Bordo, supra note 30. Bordo argues that
the Federal Reserve’s own strict adherence to the real bills doctrine in the 1920s
led to the stock market crash of 1929, and eventually—after the Federal Reserve
failed to act as a lender of last resort—to the onset of the Great Depression. Bordo,
supra note 30.
35. Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 3.
OF CLEVELAND
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intermediaries comes in the form of transaction fees, which must be
borne by the buyer, the seller, or both parties, depending on the
particular intermediary and the nature of the exchange.36 Not only
do the presence of these fees reduce the seller’s profit margin, but
they also limit the minimum practical size of the transaction to a few
dollars, cutting off the possibility of smaller value transactions such
as micropayments.37
Minimizing the risks associated with these transactions is a
primary purpose of third party intermediaries.38 The most pressing
of these risks is the threat of fraud, such as when buyers attempt to
reverse the charges to their account after receiving a good or
service.39 (The process of payment reversal, fraudulent or otherwise,
is known as a charge-back).40 When these allegations arise,
intermediaries are unable to avoid mediating the ensuing dispute, an
36. David D. Friedman & Kerry L. Macintosh, The Cash of the Twenty-First
Century, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 273, 277 (2001).
Merchants typically must pay between 2% and 6% of the total purchase price to
both the merchant bank and credit card company. Tucker, supra note 21, at 604.
The popular online payment website, PayPal, charges sellers a 1.9% to 2.9% +
$0.30 fee. For personal transfers funded by credit or debit cards, a 2.9% + $0.30
fee is assessed, with the sender having the option of which party will cover the
cost. Fees, PAYPAL, https://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=_display-feesoutside (last visited Sept. 27, 2011).
37. Friedman & Macintosh, supra note 36, at 277; Nakamoto, supra note 3, at
1; MARGARET JANE RADIN ET AL., INTERNET COMMERCE: THE EMERGING LEGAL
FRAMEWORK 1194 n.9 (2nd ed. 2006); Nakamoto, Bitcoin Open Source
Implementation of P2P Currency, supra note 27. A micropayment is
a financial payment in an amount that is small relative to the
transaction costs that would be incurred in making the payment
using traditional payment mechanisms. . . .
In the late 1990s micropayments were heralded as a breakthrough
payment technology for Internet commerce, one that would make
possible a broad array of new business models. Micropayments
seemed to be the ideal way to sell low-value digital products for
small amounts of money, amounting to a large revenue stream in
the aggregate. But micropayments never caught on.
RADIN ET AL., supra note 37, at 1194 (footnote omitted). While their past failure
may be attributed to their impracticality, other theories exist as to why they were
unsuccessful. Id. at 1177. See, e.g., Clay Shirky, The Case Against Micropayments,
P2P FOUNDATION (Dec. 19, 2000), http://openp2p.com/lpt/a//p2p/2000/12/19
/micropayments.html (arguing that micropayments failed “because they are a bad
idea”).
38. Kenneth N. Kuttner & James J. McAndrews, Personal On-Line
Payments, 7 ECON. POL’Y REV. 35, 41 (2001).
39. Id.; Friedman & Macintosh, supra note 36, at 277. These payment
reversals are both costly and inconvenient for merchants, and also unavoidable
when conducted using any medium other than physical currency. Nakamoto,
supra note 3, at 1.
40. Kuttner & McAndrews, supra note 38.
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act that increases their overhead, the fees they impose on their
customers, and, thus, the transaction costs of the entire system.41
Because certain types of businesses tend to create higher rates of
charge-backs than others, some intermediaries may even prevent
their customers from patronizing them altogether, thus diminishing
freedom in the market.42 Finally, these intermediaries often retain a
large quantity of the parties’ personal data to decrease the number of
times it is transmitted over the Internet.43 Thus, they must also be
trusted to store this information safely, keeping the parties’ purchase
histories private and their sensitive account information secure from
the dangers of identity theft.44
In the Section that follows, the underlying architecture of the
Bitcoin system is explored, in addition to the ways that this
architecture attempts to do away with many of the costs imposed by
this “trust-based model.”
B. Replacing Trust with Cryptography
1. System Architecture
The Bitcoin system is comprised of a decentralized peer-to-peer
network of connected computers, also known as nodes, each running
a version of the Bitcoin client software.45 In addition to providing
other functions, the client serves as the user’s digital wallet, which
holds his supply of Bitcoins.46
When the client is initially run, the application generates a set of
cryptographic keys that are mathematically related to one another.47
One key is private and remains concealed on the user’s computer.48
41. Tucker, supra note 21, at 605.
42. The best examples of these businesses are those that provide online access
to either adult content or gambling; individuals who purchase adult content, or
lose money through online gambling websites, often dispute the charges with their
credit card company. In some cases, financial intermediaries prevent their
customers from patronizing these businesses because they are illegal in the
customer’s jurisdiction. RADIN ET AL., supra note 37, at 21–22.
43. Kuttner & McAndrews, supra note 38, at 41.
44. Nakamoto, Bitcoin Open Source Implementation of P2P Currency, supra
note 27.
45. Simonite, supra note 9; Lowenthal, supra note 12. The latest version of
the Bitcoin client can be found at http://bitcoin.org.
46. J.P., Virtual Currency, THE ECONOMIST (Jun. 13, 2011, 8:30 PM)
http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/06/virtual-currency.
47. These keys are stored as a part of the user’s wallet file and “can be
transferred to another computer, for example, if [the user] upgrades.” Simonite,
supra note 9.
48. Id.
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The other key, often referred to as a Bitcoin address, is made public;
it is used to accept Bitcoin payments from other users.49 Together,
these keys serve as the user’s digital signature.50
The client is also responsible for downloading a log of all
transactions that have ever taken place on the network.51 Because
Bitcoin transactions are organized into successive groups, called
blocks, this log is aptly named the blockchain.52 The blockchain
records the path of every Bitcoin as it changes hands through the
network, thereby functioning as the definitive public ledger of every
user’s account balance.53
The mechanics of the Bitcoin system are best understood
through the context of a transaction as it propagates through the
network. When a sender initiates a transfer of Bitcoins, the amount
of the transaction is encoded with the recipient’s public key.54 “By
exploiting the mathematical relationship between his public and
private keys,” the recipient is able to prove his identity and accept
the transfer.55 The sender, meanwhile, acknowledges the transfer of
these coins by signing the same transaction with his private key,
thereby informing the network that the Bitcoins formerly located in
his account now have a new owner.56 The results of the exchange
are then broadcast to all of the nodes connected to the Bitcoin
network.57
However, for the network to approve the transaction, and add it
to the newest block at the end of the chain, it must undergo a
complex verification process that utilizes hashing and forced work.58
49. Id. Bitcoin addresses generally look something like this:
1LhksUu1AcqoUdehhhY99oRDPNynCszymB.
50. Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 2.
51. If the user’s client is not connected to the Bitcoin network for an extended
period of time, upon rejoining, it will download the newest blocks that were added
while it was offline. Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 1.
52. J.P., supra note 46; Thill, supra note 16; Altstedter, supra note 2.
53. Danny O’Brien, Imagine Your Computer As a Wallet Full of Bitcoins,
IRISH TIMES (Nov. 26, 2010), http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/finance
/2010/1126/1224284180416.html (on file with author). The blockchain can be
viewed online at http://blockexplorer.com.
54. J.P., supra note 46; Simonite, supra note 9.
55. J.P., supra note 46; Simonite, supra note 9. A critical aspect of this
process is that “it is practically impossible—even with the most powerful
supercomputer—to work out someone’s private key from their public key.” This
ensures that an attacker may not fraudulently accept Bitcoins by masquerading as
the intended recipient. Simonite, supra note 9.
56. Simonite, supra note 9; Lowenthal, supra note 12.
57. Altstedter, supra note 2.
58. Simonite, supra note 9. J.P. provides a simple explanation of hashing:
A hashing algorithm converts a message into a number called a hash value
. . . . If this number is big enough, it provides a unique representation of the
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Using a hash value of the new and previously valid transactions,
nodes race to determine the solution to a cryptographic puzzle that
can only be found through extensive trial and error.59 Once the
solution is discovered, it is forwarded to the other nodes so that its
accuracy can be verified.60 If they are satisfied with the result, the
new transactions are approved, and each node adds the block
containing them to the end of their chain.61 The process then begins
again to confirm all Bitcoin transactions that have occurred in the
interim while the nodes were solving the previous block.62
To incentivize users to participate in the computationally
intensive task of verifying the network’s transactions, the first node
to discover the solution to each block is rewarded with 50
Bitcoins.63 However, this amount is halved for every 210,000 blocks
that are found, up to a total issuance of approximately 21 million

original . . . . [I]t is impossible to reconstruct the original on the basis of the
[hash value] alone . . . [n]or is it possible to predict what the [hash value]
would be for even a slightly tweaked version of the original message . . . .
As a result, hashing is . . . an irreversible process.
J.P., supra note 46.
59. J.P., supra note 46; Altstedter, supra note 2. Because many solutions to
the puzzle exist, the chance of finding one is dependent upon the number of nodes
searching and the amount of computing power they dedicate to the process. To
ensure that solutions are found at a steady rate as these inputs change, a variable is
correspondingly adjusted that makes it either easier or more difficult to find a
solution. Lowenthal, supra note 12. By making the task of solution discovery
“prohibitively costly to . . . individual [nodes], but relatively cheap for the network
as a whole,” users are effectively prevented from attempting to include forged
transactions into the blockchain. J.P., supra note 46.
60. Simonite, supra note 9.
61. Altstedter, supra note 2. As Nakamoto explains:
Nodes always consider the longest chain to be the correct one and will
keep working on extending it. If two nodes broadcast different versions
of the next block simultaneously, some nodes may receive one or the
other first. In that case, they work on the first one they received, but save
the other branch in case it becomes longer. The tie will be broken when
the next [block] is found and one branch becomes longer; the nodes that
were working on the other branch will then switch to the longer one.
Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 3.
62. Lowenthal, supra note 12.
63. The winning nodes are not only rewarded with newly minted Bitcoins.
Users are encouraged to include with their payments a minimal, self-imposed
transaction fee, which operates to prioritize it in the verification process. When the
block is solved, the winning node also receives the sum of all transaction fees
included with it. In this way, as the rate of coins that are minted decreases, the
system is still able to provide participation incentives. Nakamoto, supra note 3, at
4; Simonite, supra note 9.
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Bitcoins.64 This process is known as mining, because it is meant to
imitate the act of prospecting for precious minerals.65
2. Design Implications
Even in the abstract, the Bitcoin system is quite complex, but
necessarily so. Its architecture provides it with a number of
advantages over the trust-based model previously discussed, the first
of which is its novel approach to counterfeit prevention.66
All currencies must address the problem of counterfeiting; in the
context of digital currencies, it is known as the double-spending
problem.67 Because these coins are essentially nothing more than
bits of data, the same coin may be copied and used multiple times.68
While this is not a problem for other types of computer files, the
ability to arbitrarily create and spend the same coin erodes one of
the facets that makes money valuable: scarcity.69
Instead of introducing into the system a trusted intermediary to
guarantee that the parties do not attempt to double-spend their coins,
Bitcoin solves this problem through the use of its blockchain.70
Because all transactions are broadcast to each node in the network
and eventually find their way into this public ledger, each node has
incontestable proof of the ownership and transactional history of
each Bitcoin.71 The sheer computational force required to alter the
blockchain ensures that transactions cannot be undone and that the
same coin cannot be spent twice.72
64. Vitalik Buterin, Block Reward Halving: A Guide, BITCOIN MAGAZINE
(Nov. 27, 2012), http://bitcoinmagazine.com/block-reward-halving-a-guide. At the
current rate of block discovery, this will occur roughly once every four years. J.P.,
supra note 46. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
65. J.P., supra note 46. “The steady addition of a constant . . . amount of new
coins is analogous to gold miners expending resources to add gold to circulation.
In [the case of Bitcoin], it is CPU time and electricity that is expended.”
Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 4.
66. Thill, supra note 16.
67. BARBARA A. GOOD, PRIVATE MONEY: EVERYTHING OLD IS NEW AGAIN,
FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND (1998), available at http://www.clevelandfed
.org/research/commentary/1998/0401.pdf; Lowenthal, supra note 12.
68. Lowenthal, supra note 12.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Because the verification of each block requires the hash of the previously
valid blocks, an attacker would be forced to redo the work of each of the blocks
after the one that involved the transaction he sought to reverse or change. Thus, he
would have to eventually outpace the work of all other “honest” nodes on the
network to ensure that his doctored blockchain would become the accepted
standard. After each new “honest” block is added to the chain after the attack
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Bitcoin also manages to provide a certain degree of privacy to its
users.73 Despite each node’s access to the blockchain, transactions
are kept partially anonymous because only the users’ Bitcoin
addresses (that is, their public keys) are published within it.74 As no
personally identifying information is tied to this address, viewers are
only able to discern that one party sent a certain amount of Bitcoins
to another.75 Functionally, this is similar to the way information is
released at stock exchanges: trade sizes and times are published
without revealing the identity of the party buying or selling.76
Nevertheless, the public nature of the blockchain means that
transactional anonymity is not foolproof, especially if users fail to
take additional precautions to maintain their privacy.77

begins, it becomes exponentially more improbable that he could accomplish this
goal. Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 4. Nevertheless, if the attacker were able to
amass a majority of the computing power on the network, his goal would become
feasible. The chance of this occurring is unlikely because “[t]he combined power
of the network is currently equal to one of the most powerful supercomputers in
the world,” and would thus prove to be exceptionally expensive. Simonite, supra
note 9 (quoting one of Bitcoin’s core developers, Jeff Garzik); J.P., supra note 46.
Regardless, a successful attack would not subject the Bitcoin system to “arbitrary
changes, such as creating value out of thin air or taking money that never belonged
to the attacker. Nodes are not going to accept an invalid transaction as payment,
and honest nodes will never accept a block containing them.” Nakamoto, supra
note 3, at 6. Furthermore, the fact that nodes are rewarded with Bitcoins for
verifying new blocks provides an incentive for the attacker to stay honest. As
Nakamoto explains:
If [an] attacker [were] able to assemble more CPU power than all the
honest nodes, he would have to choose between using it to defraud
people by stealing back his payments, or using it to generate new coins.
He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules, such rules that
favour him with more new coins than everyone else combined, than to
undermine the system and the validity of his own wealth.
Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 4.
73. Id. at 6.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. As many have pointed out, Bitcoin only provides pseudo-anonymity.
Because users are still identified by their addresses, “sophisticated network
analysis techniques [could be used by law enforcement] to parse the transaction
flow and track down individual Bitcoin users.” Adrian Chen, The Underground
Website Where You Can Buy Any Drug Imaginable, GAWKER (Jun. 1, 2011),
http://gawker.com/5805928/the-underground-website-where-you-can-buy-any-rug
-imaginable (quoting core Bitcoin developer, Jeff Garzik). Indeed, “individuals
sometimes post [their addresses] online in ways that can be connected to their
online identities.” Grinberg, supra note 8, at 179. See Fergal Reid & Martin
Harrigan, An Analysis of Anonymity in the Bitcoin System, CORNELL UNIV.
LIBRARY (2011), http://arxiv.org/pdf/1107.4524v1.pdf (concluding that by “using
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Because the Bitcoin system is able to manage all of these
functions itself, it reduces its users’ reliance on financial
intermediaries.78 As a result, small value transactions are made
possible, and the costs of doing business are reduced.79 Furthermore,
the impossibility of payment reversal, combined with the pseudoanonymous nature of Bitcoin payments, allows users to transact with
any merchant they see fit, regardless of the questionable nature of
that merchant’s business.80
In addition to reducing its dependency on financial
intermediaries, the Bitcoin system also needs no central bank to
function.81 The initial issuance of the currency is accomplished
through the process of mining, which rewards the system’s early
adopters in exchange for their help in securing and supporting the
network.82 The network also addresses the issue of regulating the
supply of Bitcoins by setting a cap on the amount of Bitcoins that
can ever be created at 21 million.83 Because miners are compensated
for validating blocks, an event calculated to occur roughly once

an appropriate network representation, it is possible to map many users to public
keys” and that “casual users need to be aware of this, especially when sending
Bitcoins to users and organizations they would prefer not to be publicly associated
with”). One such precaution a user could take would be to generate a new address
for each transaction. Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 6.
78. Fees, however, have not been completely eliminated. Users looking to
trade the currency on Bitcoin exchanges and buyers seeking to protect themselves
from fraudulent sellers through the use of escrow services must pay fees to the
entities operating these businesses. Bitcoin Has Got Geeks Excited. What About
Economists?, supra note 8; Fees, BTCROW, http://btcrow.com (follow the “Fees”
hyperlink located at the bottom of the page) (last visited Oct. 1, 2011). See
discussion infra Parts III.A, IV.A; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
79. Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 1.
80. There are other notable benefits to Bitcoin’s reduction of financial
intermediaries. First, the currency is essentially a digital cash system, a user does
not need to rely on his credit history to qualify to use it, as is the case with credit
cards. Bitcoin Has Got Geeks Excited. What About Economists?, supra note 8.
Second, every Bitcoin transaction, regardless of where it is sent, typically clears
within ten minutes, as opposed to the days it takes banks to complete international
transfers. Bitcoin for Business, BITCOIN.ORG, http://bitcoin.org/en/bitcoin-forbusinesses (last visited Apr. 10, 2013); Melvin Richardson, Processing Time of
Receiving an International Bank Wire Transfer, EHOW, http://www.ehow.com
/about_5456118_processing-international-bank-wire-transfer.html (last visited
Apr. 10, 2013).
81. J.P., supra note 46.
82. Nakamoto, supra note 3, at 4.
83. J.P., supra note 46. Should the system survive long enough, this plateau in
the supply of Bitcoins should occur around 2030. Id.
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every ten minutes, the supply of Bitcoins increases at a steady,
predictable rate.84
This aspect of the Bitcoin system should, in theory, keep
inflation low and place investment and spending decisions on more
solid ground.85 In fact, as the number of Bitcoins issued begins to
decline, their value will grow.86 Slow and steady deflation like this
is normally a destructive force in modern economies, primarily
because it is unexpected.87 Bitcoin, on the other hand, should not fall
victim to this problem, because its users will anticipate the effect.88
II. BITCOIN’S LEGAL STATUS
When first introduced to Bitcoin, individuals often question its
legality.89 In other words, they wonder if someone may lawfully
create a private currency like Bitcoin in the United States. In fact,
both digital and tangible private currencies are nothing new, the
latter having existed in this country for over two centuries.90
Looking at the issue in its entirety requires an analysis of certain
provisions of the United States Constitution, in addition to an
obscure currency-related law—the Stamp Payments Act of 1862. An
ultimate finding of legality should have a positive impact on the
demand for Bitcoins because legal uncertainty tends to inhibit
economic growth.91
A. The Constitution
The Constitution gives Congress the power “to coin money” and
“regulate the value thereof”92 while also prohibiting the states from
84. Interestingly, Milton Friedman, a Nobel laureate in economics, argued
that automated systems to increase the money supply could replace the role of
central banks, such as the Federal Reserve. Id.; MISHKIN, supra note 29, at 11.
85. J.P., supra note 46. See discussion infra Part III.B.
86. Simonite, supra note 9. Bitcoins “can be divided down to the eighth
decimal place, which may prove increasingly useful [as] their value grows.”
Lowenthal, supra note 12.
87. Simonite, supra note 9 (quoting Russ Roberts, professor of economics at
George Mason University).
88. Id.
89. Jacob Goldstein & David Kestenbaum, What Is Bitcoin?, NPR (Aug. 24,
2011), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/08/24/138673630/what-is-bitcoin;
O’Brien, supra note 53.
90. GOOD, supra note 67. More recent examples include the Ithaca Hour and
BerkShare. See discussion infra Part II.B; see also infra note 110 and
accompanying text.
91. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 182; PENG HWA ANG, ORDERING CHAOS:
REGULATING THE INTERNET 22 (2005).
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
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doing the same.93 The Framers’ definition of “money,” though, was
limited only to coins.94 While the document also forbids the states
from issuing paper money,95 it is silent concerning the federal
government’s ability to do so.96 Thus, the Constitution goes no
further than establishing Congress’s authority over the money of the
United States to the exclusion of the states.97 That is, it does not
prohibit the private issuance of currency inasmuch as it makes no
mention of the subject altogether.98
B. The Stamp Payments Act of 1862
In the latter half of the 19th century, Congress finally addressed
the issue of private currency.99 Its action stemmed from a concern that
individuals were hoarding United States coins, because the value of
their metal surpassed the face value of the coins.100 The resulting
shortage of coins led the issuance of private bank notes of small
denomination.101 Congress responded with the Stamp Payments Act
of 1862, which attempted to combat the problem with criminal
sanctions.102 Though the Act has been amended multiple times over
the past 150 years, section two remains substantively the same to this
day.103 It provides that:
93. “No state shall . . . coin money . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. “The
Framers were concerned primarily with restricting the states from influencing
monetary policy . . . .” LEWIS D. SOLOMON, RETHINKING OUR CENTRALIZED
MONETARY SYSTEM: THE CASE FOR A SYSTEM OF LOCAL CURRENCIES 95–96
(1996).
94. SOLOMON, supra note 93, at 96.
95. “No state shall . . . emit bills of credit . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
96. Congress’s authority to issue paper money was affirmed by the Supreme
Court in The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 (1871). SOLOMON, supra note 93,
at 96.
97. SOLOMON, supra note 93, at 95–96; Grinberg, supra note 8, at 182.
98. SOLOMON, supra note 93, at 95–96. Other acts from our nation’s founding
era (such as the Coinage Act of 1792, which established the United States Mint
and regulated the nation’s coins) are also silent about private currencies. Id. at 96–
97.
99. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 183; SOLOMON, supra note 93, at 97–98.
100. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 183 (citing Thomas P. Vartanian et. al, Echoes
of the Past with Implications for the Future: The Stamp Payments Act of 1862 and
Electronic Commerce, 67 BANKING REP. (BNA) 464 (1996)).
101. Catherine Lee Wilson, Banking on the Net: Extending Bank Regulation to
Electronic Money and Beyond, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 671, 693 (1997) (citing
Thomas P. Vartanian et. al, Echoes of the Past with Implications for the Future:
The Stamp Payments Act of 1862 and Electronic Commerce, 67 BANKING REP.
(BNA) 464, 464 (1996)).
102. Id. at 693.
103. The Act was amended in 1873, 1909, 1948, and 1994. SOLOMON, supra
note 93, at 98.

2013]

COMMENT

1133

Whoever makes, issues, circulates, or pays out any note,
check, memorandum, token, or other obligation for a less
sum than $1, intended to circulate as money or to be
received or used in lieu of lawful money of the United
States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than six months, or both.104
While Congress has paid some attention to the Act in the
modern era, no published court opinions have interpreted its
meaning since 1899.105 Early case law, though limited, is able to
provide at least some insight as to its application.
In United States v. Van Auken,106 the Supreme Court recognized
that in passing the Act, Congress primarily intended it “to prevent
competition with the national currency.”107 Thus, it would not apply
to anything with a limited circulation.108 This determination in Van
Auken, and in similar cases, rested on the fact that the notes were
only redeemable in merchandise and that they did not physically
resemble the nation’s official currency.109
Modern, paper-based, private currencies such as the Ithaca Hour
and BerkShare only circulate within particular communities and are
only accepted at certain businesses.110 Furthermore, their values are
104. 18 U.S.C. § 336 (2006).
105. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 190. See United States v. Roussopulous, 95 F.
977 (D. Minn. 1899).
106. United States v. Van Auken, 96 U.S. 366 (1877).
107. SOLOMON, supra note 93, at 97.
108. Van Auken, 96 U.S. at 367–68.
109. Id. at 367–68 (“Small notes payable in any specific articles, if issued,
could have only a neighborhood circulation, and but a limited one there.”); United
States v. Monongahela Bridge Co., 26 F. Cas. 1292, 1292–93 (W.D. Pa. 1863)
(“[T]hese tickets have no resemblance . . . to the coin of the United States . . . of
which it was the design of the act to advance and protect. . . . They do not contain
a promise to pay money, they are not the representatives of money, and therefore
cannot be said to circulate, or be intended to circulate as money.”); Roussopulous,
95 F. at 978 (“[T]he metal token . . . differs . . . plainly from all coins of the United
States, and is not liable to be mistaken for any of them . . . . It does not purport to
be a piece of money, or an obligation to pay money, and the obligation expressed
is in terms solvable in merchandise. It cannot, therefore, have been intended to
circulate as money, or to be received and used in lieu of lawful money, and does
not come within the prohibition . . . .”); Grinberg, supra note 8, at 188 n.132.
110. GOOD, supra note 67; Jane O’Brien, BerkShares Boost the Berkshires in
Massachusetts, BBC (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-uscanada-14814834; SOLOMON, supra note 93, at 98; Grinberg, supra note 8, at 182.
The same can be said for the digital currencies discussed supra, note 8, as they
may only be used to purchase goods in the virtual worlds of which they are a part.
Grinberg, supra note 8, at 186. The Ithaca Hour is a local currency that was
established in 1991 in Ithaca, New York, by a resident and self-described
“community economist.” The currency is denominated in Hours and notes come in
various amounts; each Hour is equivalent to $10. Since its creation, approximately
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tied to the U.S. dollar, and their smallest notes are denominated in
values greater than one dollar.111 As such, they have been able to
escape criminal liability under the Act.112
Bitcoin is not geographically constricted like these currencies.
Its supporters are pushing for it to be a widely accepted medium of
exchange on the Internet, an aspect that could lead a court to find
that Bitcoins, indeed, “circulate as money.”113 Furthermore, Bitcoin
was designed to be economically superior to government-backed
currencies, and those who transact in Bitcoins necessarily do so to
the exclusion of the U.S. dollar.114 In this sense, some may see
Bitcoin as competing with the nation’s currency.115 Finally, because
Bitcoin is able to restore the practicality of micropayments, there
can be little doubt that it will be used to engage in transactions far
below the Act’s one-dollar threshold.116
There are many valid counterarguments, however, that Bitcoin
would fall outside of the Act’s scope. First, because Bitcoins are
primarily intended for Internet transactions, they do not actually
compete with the currency of the United States; it may be more
accurate to say that digital currencies, like Bitcoin, compete with
online payment processors, such as PayPal and Dwolla, and credit
cards.117 Second, unlike the previously mentioned community
currencies, Bitcoin’s value is not pegged to the dollar, but is
determined by supply and demand.118 As such, an argument can be
made that Bitcoin transactions, no matter how small, are not “for a
less sum than $1,” because Bitcoins are not denominated in
dollars.119
In evaluating how the Stamp Payments Act could apply to
digital currencies in general, scholars have suggested that in order

$63,000 worth of Hours have been issued. GOOD, supra note 67. The BerkShare is
another community currency that circulates in the BerkShare region of
Massachusetts. Created in 2006, it is accepted at over 400 local businesses. The
currency comes in values of 1, 5, 10, 20, and 50; each BerkShare is worth 95% of
$1; that is, they represent a 5% discount. What Are BerkShares?, BERKSHARES,
INC., http://www.berkshares.org/whatareberkshares.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2012).
111. GOOD, supra note 67; O’Brien, supra note 110.
112. GOOD, supra note 67; Grinberg, supra note 8, at 186 (citing Ellen
Graham, Community Groups Print Local (and Legal) Currencies, WALL STREET
J., Jun. 27, 1996, at B1).
113. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 187; 18 U.S.C. § 336 (2006).
114. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
115. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 187.
116. Id. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
117. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 187.
118. See discussion infra Part III.A.
119. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 186; 18 U.S.C. § 336 (2006).
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for something to “circulate as money,” it must posses the physical
characteristics of money.120 This argument is supported in the text of
the Act, which refers to “any note, check, memorandum, token, or
other obligation.”121 Each of these items is a “physical manifestation
of currency.”122 As a digital currency, Bitcoin is completely
intangible, a fact that could exclude it from the Act’s reach.123
Perhaps the strongest textual argument is that each of the
prohibited items in the list above is an obligation, as is indicated by
the final phrase “or other obligation.”124 Unlike many of the items at
issue in the cases interpreting the Act, Bitcoins are not obligations
because no “entity has promised to provide something in return for
[them].”125 Thus, even if an argument were made that Bitcoins are
“digital tokens,” they would fall outside the list’s range, as they are
not obligations.126
Finally, because the Act was passed to address a shortage of
United States coins, its legislative purpose has long since
vanished.127 Although it was stylistically amended as recently as
1994, Congress did not add “digital currency” or any similar term to
the list of proscribed items.128 Their failure to do so could certainly
indicate that they did not intend for the Act to apply to such
things.129 Furthermore, it is not likely that when the Act was
120. Brian W. Smith & Ramsey J. Wilson, How Best to Guide the Evolution of
Electronic Currency Law, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1105, 1110 (1997); 18 U.S.C. § 336.
121. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 188; 18 U.S.C. § 336.
122. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 188.
123. Although, “[i]f faced with an ether-based payment system . . . a court may
dismiss the relevance of distinctions based on physical attributes and instead may
focus on similarities arising from non-physical properties, such as the rights and
obligations of the holders.” Smith & Wilson, supra note 120, at 1110.
124. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 188–89 n.132; 18 U.S.C. § 336.
125. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 189. See United States v. Van Auken, 96 U.S.
366, 367 (1877) (item was an obligation from The Bangor Furnace Company that
could be redeemed for 50¢ in goods at their store); United States v. Monongahela
Bridge Co., 26 F.Cas. 1292, 1292 (W.D. Pa. 1863) (item was a paper ticket for one
trip across the Monongahela Bridge); United States v. Roussopulous, 95 F. 977,
978 (D. Minn. 1899) (item was a metal token from Clark & Boice Lumber
Company that could be redeemed for 50¢ in merchandise).
126. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 189.
127. Wilson, supra note 101, at 693.
128. Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Digital Currency 28–29 (Yale
Law School, Working Paper, 2011) (on file with author) (later published as
Grinberg, supra note 8).
129. Id. at 29. Their inaction could also “be taken as a sign that Congress
intended to breathe new life into the Act, reaffirming and extending its prohibition
to all twentieth century obligations—including electronic ones.” Kerry Lynn
Macintosh, The New Money, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 659, 672 n.78 (1999). Even
if this were the case, Bitcoins would still side-step proscription, as they are not
obligations.
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originally written, lawmakers could have intended for it to
encompass digital currencies, a machination of technology that
would not be conceived for over 100 more years.130
In lieu of the continuing expansion in the number of digital
currencies, the Treasury Department has requested that the Act be
interpreted narrowly by the Department of Justice; some scholars have
even called for its repeal.131 Regardless of the Act’s continued
existence, Bitcoin is unlikely to be challenged by it, as the arguments
for bringing Bitcoin within its purview are overwhelmingly outweighed
by the arguments against doing so. Indeed, digital currencies have been
around in some form or another for over a decade and neither their
creators nor their users have yet to be prosecuted under the Act—nor
should they be worried about this possibility.132As such, the remainder
of this Comment surveys the activities occurring within the Bitcoin
economy, with a focus on how regulators should respond to its more
“concerning” aspects.
III. THE BITCOIN ECONOMY
A. Market Participants
In Bitcoin’s short lifespan, it has amassed a base of approximately
10,000 users, including several hundred merchants that currently
accept the digital currency as a method of payment.133 However, the
currency has yet to find adoption with any mainstream retailers,
such as Amazon.com.134 Despite the fact that the overwhelming
majority of these merchants are small businesses that operate in the
technology sector,135 the goods and services provided by the
remainder are incredibly diverse.136 Indeed, they run the gamut from
sellers of clothing, home, and car accessories, to brick-and-mortar
establishments, like restaurants, hotels, and travel companies.137
130. Macintosh, supra note 129, at 672.
131. Wilson, supra note 101, at 693; Macintosh, supra note 129, at 672 n.78.
132. Smith & Wilson, supra note 120, at 1111.
133. J.P., supra note 46.
134. Daniel Roberts, The Clock Is Ticking on Bitcoin, CNN MONEY (Jun. 17,
2011), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2011/06/17/the-clock-is-ticking-on-bitcoin.
135. Id. For example, these businesses include providers of Internet services
such as website design and development, virtual private and dedicated servers,
domain names, VoIP, and security, in addition to software, online auctions,
technical consulting, and a number of other digital products. Trade, BITCOIN WIKI,
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Trade (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) (listing online and real
world businesses that currently accept Bitcoin).
136. Trade, supra note 135.
137. Goldstein & Kestenbaum, supra note 89; Trade, supra note 135. New
York’s Meze Grill, located in midtown Manhattan, has garnered significant
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Three attorneys located in the United States have even offered to
provide legal services in exchange for Bitcoins.138 Furthermore, a
handful of organizations (including a few nonprofits) accept
donations in Bitcoins; among these is the notorious whistle-blowing
website, Wikileaks, and the hacker group Lulz Security.139
Businesses in the financial sector also make up an important part
of the Bitcoin economy. While they range from providers of escrow
and online wallet services, to mobile payment systems, perhaps the
most crucial of these are Bitcoin exchanges.140 By matching buyers
with sellers, these businesses facilitate the conversion of Bitcoins to
(and from) at least two dozen established fiat currencies, such as the
dollar, euro, and pound sterling.141 For individuals looking to

attention in the news media for accepting Bitcoins. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note
134.
138. Trade, supra note 135.
139. Donation Accepting Organizations and Projects, BITCOIN WIKI,
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Donation-accepting_organizations_and_projects
(last
visited Oct. 2, 2011) (listing notable organizations that accept Bitcoin donations);
Eria Ogg, Hackers Steal More Customer Info From Sony’s Servers, CNET NEWS
(Jun. 2, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31021_3-20068414-260/hackers-stealmore-customer-info-from-sony-servers. Near the beginning of 2011, the
Electronic Frontier Foundation began accepting Bitcoin donations but abandoned
the practice six months later as a result of the “untested legal concerns” Bitcoin
creates. Rainey Reitman, Bitcoin: A Step Toward Censorship-Resistant Digital
Currency, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Jan. 20, 2011), https://www
.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/01/bitcoin-step-toward-censorship-resistant; Cohn, supra
note 18. Nakamoto was undoubtedly very concerned about the negative attention
Bitcoin was receiving after Wikileaks began accepting the digital currency to
support its activities. Before essentially disappearing from the Internet, one of his
final public posts contained the message: “WikiLeaks has kicked the hornet’s nest,
and the swarm is headed towards us.” Satoshi Nakamoto, Re:PC World Article on
Bitcoin, BITCOIN FORUM (Dec. 11, 2010, 11:39 PM), https://bitcointalk.org/index
.php?topic=2216.msg29280#msg29280; Joe Duncko, Who Created Bitcoins?,
WRITTEN BY JOE DUNCKO (Jun. 20, 2011), http://joeduncko.com/2011/06/20
/who-created-bitcoins.
140. Trade, supra note 135. As opposed to the Bitcoin client, which stores the
user’s currency only on their computer, online wallet services store Bitcoins in a
centralized location so that any web-connected device can have access to them. In
a way, they may be thought of as Bitcoin banks, although they do not perform any
traditional banking services. FAQ, FLEXCOIN, http://www.flexcoin.com/15.html
(last visited Oct. 2, 2011); J.P., supra note 46.
141. Bitcoin’s Network of Exchanges Expands, BITCOIN MONEY (Sept. 6,
2011), http://www.bitcoinmoney.com/post/9872899440/global-exchange-tradingexpands. These exchanges also allow traders to engage in arbitrage opportunities.
Vitalik Buterin, BTC Trader: Bitcoin Arbitrage Made Easy, BITCOIN MAGAZINE
(Nov. 2, 2012), http://bitcoinmagazine.com/btc-trader-bitcoin-arbitrage-madeeasy. Bitcoin Arbitrage Opportunities, NYSE-GROUP.DE, http://nyse-group.de
/bitcoin-arbitrage (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
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transact in Bitcoins without having to mine for them, these
exchanges provide the simplest method of obtaining the digital
currency and also the easiest way to convert Bitcoins back to other
fiat currencies.142 The number of operating exchanges continues to
expand and the volume of transactions that pass through them is
fairly substantial.143 For example, Mt. Gox, one of the more popular
exchanges, has moved $70 million in funds in the last six months
alone.144
As far as individual users go, those holding Bitcoins do so for a
number of different reasons. Categorically, they vary from privacy,
technology, and cryptography enthusiasts to speculators and
government-mistrusting individuals who would rather hold their
assets in a vehicle other than state-controlled fiat money.145 One
group of Bitcoin users, however, has received significantly more
attention by the media than others—criminals.146
Due to the partial anonymity that the Bitcoin system provides,147
many have raised the issue of its ability to facilitate a multitude of
illegal activities, including money laundering, tax evasion, the sale
of stolen credit cards, and the funding of online gambling (in
jurisdictions where it is prohibited).148 For the most part, the amount
of criminal activity occurring with digital currencies is, at this point,
mere conjecture and undoubtedly subject to the hyperbolic
tendencies of the press.149 The use of Bitcoins to purchase illegal
drugs through the Internet, however, is very real.150
The Silk Road Marketplace is a website that allow its users to
buy and sell anything, from marijuana and heroin to LSD and
ecstasy.151 This online black market operates on the anonymizing
142. J.P., supra note 46.
143. Bitcoin’s Network of Exchanges Expands, supra note 141.
144. Mt. Gox (USD), BITCOIN CHARTS, http://bitcoincharts.com/markets
/mtgoxUSD_trades.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
145. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 165.
146. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 77; Tom Cheredar, Forget Piracy, U.S.
Government Is Going After Bitcoin, VENTUREBEAT (Jun. 8, 2011), http://venture
beat.com/2011/06/08/government-crackdown-on-bitcoin; Jerry Brito, Online Cash
Could Challenge Governments, Banks, TIME: TECHLAND (Apr. 16, 2011),
http://techland.time.com/2011/04/16/online-cash-bitcoin-could-challengegovernments; Jack Hough, The Bitcoin Triples Again, SMARTMONEY (Jun. 10,
2011), http://www.smartmoney.com/invest/stocks/the-bitcoin-triples-again-1307
638613180; J.P., supra note 46.
147. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
148. Brito, supra note 146; Cohn, supra note 18.
149. Tucker, supra note 21, at 618.
150. Chen, supra note 77.
151. Id. Even this black market has limits, though. Its terms of service bans
“anything who’s [sic] purpose is to harm or defraud, such as stolen credit cards,
assassinations, and weapons of mass destruction.” Id.

2013]

COMMENT

1139

network, Tor,152 which allows the site to obfuscate both its location
and the identity of its administrators.153 Set up in much the same
way as traditional e-commerce websites, visitors peruse the
hundreds of items listed for sale, in addition to reviews that have
been written about their sellers by previous buyers.154 After adding
items to their shopping carts, buyers are required to pay with the
only currency the website accepts: Bitcoins.155 Possibly, the most
alarming aspect of Silk Road is that a significant amount of the
market’s sellers are located in the United States and Canada.156
In June of 2011, Senators Charles Schumer of New York and
Joe Manchin of West Virginia sent a letter to United States Attorney
General Eric Holder and Drug Enforcement Agency Administrator
Michele Leonhart. They urged the officials to immediately shut
down Silk Road.157 In the letter, the Senators referenced the
“untraceable peer-to-peer currency known as Bitcoins” as the sole
method of payment accepted by the website.158 While their
description of the digital currency as “untraceable” is somewhat
exaggerated,159 it has only increased the unfavorable attention that
Bitcoin has received.160
152. On the project’s homepage, Tor is described as:
free software and an open network that helps you defend against a form
of network surveillance that threatens personal freedom and privacy . . .
by bouncing your communications around a distributed network of relays
run by volunteers all around the world: it prevents somebody watching
your Internet connection from learning what sites you visit, and it
prevents the sites you visit from learning your physical location.
TOR, https://www.torproject.org (last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
153. Chen, supra note 77.
154. Id.
155. The drugs are delivered through the United States Postal Service, and Silk
Road encourages its merchants to disguise their shipments and vacuum seal items
that could be detected through smell. Id.
156. Id.
157. Letter from Charles Schumer & Joe Manchin, United States Senators, to
Eric Holder, Attorney General of the United States (Jun. 6, 2011), available at
http://manchin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2011/6/manchin-urges-federal-lawenforcement-to-shut-down-online-black-market-for-illegal-drugs.
158. Id. Senator Schumer has also described Bitcoin as “an online form of
money laundering used to disguise the source of the money and disguise who is
both buying and selling the drug.” Brett Wolf, Bitcoin Exchanges Offer AntiMoney Laundering Aid, REUTERS, Jun. 15, 2011, http://uk.reuters.com/article
/2011/06/15/financial-bitcoin-idUKN1510930920110615.
159. See discussion supra Part I.B.2; see also supra note 77 and accompanying
text.
160. See, e.g., Keir Thomas, Could the Wikileaks Scandal Lead to New Virtual
Currency, PC WORLD (Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter
/article/213230/could_the_wikileaks_scandal_lead_to_new_virtual_currency.html;
Ogg, supra note 139.
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B. Likelihood of Success
Excepting any challenges to Bitcoin’s legality,161 however
unlikely, there are a number of hurdles that the Bitcoin economy
must overcome if the currency that drives it is to remain useful. The
first of these hurdles involves economic stability.
In the Bitcoin economy, price volatility is still a huge problem.
Both in the short and long term, the currency has been prone to
significant value fluctuations, arguably the result of ideological
enthusiasm and widespread speculation.162 Such fluctuations make it
difficult, if not impossible, for merchants to accurately price their
products in Bitcoins.163 This, in turn, has a negative effect on the
number of businesses that are willing to accept the currency as a
method of payment.164 Indeed, the Bitcoin system’s continued
existence heavily depends on its ability to attract the critical mass of
merchants and consumers necessary to make dealing in the currency
practical.165
Bitcoin’s incredible upward leaps in value, at times, have led to
the fear that it is being used primarily to speculate; that is,
individuals have been buying Bitcoins only as an investment
vehicle.166 The digital currency’s approach to capping its money
supply exacerbates this problem: the fact that Bitcoins are likely to
be worth more in the future incentivizes hoarding, thereby
161. See discussion supra Part II.
162. Bitcoin Has Got Geeks Excited. What About Economists?, supra note 8;
Timothy B. Lee, The Bitcoin Bubble, BOTTOM UP (Apr. 18, 2011), http://timothy
blee.com/2011/04/18/the-bitcoin-bubble. In terms of dollars, a “Bitcoin has been
worth as little as a few pennies and as much as $33, and after seeming to stabilize
at around $14 over the summer [of 2011], Bitcoin’s value tumbled by almost 50
percent in a matter of days in August.” James Surowiecki, Cryptocurrency, MIT
TECH. REVIEW (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.technology review.com/computing
/38392. Media coverage has had a tremendous impact on its valuation, at times,
causing tenfold jumps over short time periods. Id.
163. Cohen, supra note 26.
164. Surowiecki, supra note 162.
165. Altstedter, supra note 2. This is a difficult task, because
currencies are subject to massive network effects . . . . People who hold
obscure currencies have to waste time and money converting it to a
more popular currency before they can perform everyday transactions.
And [those] who conduct business in multiple currencies . . . also have
to worry about exchange rate risk . . . .
Lee, supra note 162. Undoubtedly, to get more merchants and consumers to accept
the currency, Bitcoin’s developers will also have to make it more user-friendly and
able to be integrated with current e-commerce systems. Rick Falkvinge, Bitcoins
Four Hurdles: Part One – Usability, FALKVINGE & CO. ON INFOPOLICY (Jun. 4,
2011), http://falkvinge.net/2011/06/04/bitcoins-four-hurdles-part-one-usability.
166. Surowiecki, supra note 162.
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preventing their use as a medium of exchange.167 Furthermore,
because Bitcoin is not the legal tender of any country, there is no
reason that its users would need to start spending them.168
Another hurdle is security. In the past few months, incidents
have occurred in the Bitcoin economy that have decreased
confidence in the currency. Two incidents resulted in the theft of
Bitcoins,169 while another led to a massive sell-off and subsequent
price crash of the digital currency.170 While all were allegedly the
result of security breaches, a failure of the Bitcoin software itself
was not directly responsible; improvements to the software,
however, could have at least reduced the damage of one of the
incidents.171 Thus, Bitcoin’s expansion also depends on its
167. Id. That is, the purpose of currencies is to facilitate transactions, not
increase the wealth of its users. Krugman, supra note 8.
168. That is, individuals cannot hold all of their legal tender, such as their U.S.
dollars, forever. Eventually bills must be paid and food must be purchased using it.
This is not the case with Bitcoins. Surowiecki, supra note 162. Bitcoin also faces a
number of other economic hurdles. For one, some critics have expressed doubt
that Bitcoin could expand enough to serve the needs of a much larger economy.
See, e.g., Presentation, Dan Kaminsky, Some Thoughts on Bitcoin, SLIDESHARE,
available at http://www.slideshare.net/dakami/bitcoin-8776098 (last visited Oct. 4,
2011). Others point to the fact that Bitcoin’s removal of intermediaries means that
there are no institutions to perform the necessary functions of borrowing and
lending. Furthermore, even if there were, Bitcoin’s irreversible transactions mean
that there would be no guarantee the parties would get their money back. Bitcoin
Has Got Geeks Excited. What About Economists?, supra note 8.
169. The first occurred when one of the most popular online wallet services,
MyBitcoin.com, mysteriously went offline for a week during the summer of 2011.
When it later resurfaced, the site’s operator claimed that it had been broken into,
and an enormous amount of Bitcoins had been stolen. At the time of the incident,
the service was holding approximately $250,000 of the currency for its customers.
There is some suspicion in the Bitcoin community that the security breach was a
sham perpetuated by the site’s operator(s) to effectively steal the Bitcoin holdings
of its customers. Adrianne Jeffries, MyBitcoin.com Is Back: A Week After
Vanishing with at Least $250 K. Worth of BTC, Site Claims It Was Hacked,
BETABEAT (Aug. 5, 2011, 7:03 AM), http://www.betabeat.com/2011/08/05
/mybitcoin-disappeared-with-bitcoins. The second incident was the result of an
unknown hacker gaining access to the computer of a Bitcoin user and stealing his
digital wallet. The wallet contained $500,000 worth of Bitcoins, based on their
trading value at the incident. Cohen, supra note 26.
170. This incident occurred in June of 2011 at the Mt. Gox exchange. Cohen,
supra note 26.
171. Indeed, these improvements have since been implemented. On September
23, 2011, the developers released version 0.4.0 of the Bitcoin client. The update
allows users to encrypt their wallets with a passphrase. Doing so means that even
if a hacker were to steal a user’s wallet, he would not automatically be able to
spend that user’s Bitcoins without breaking through this added layer of protection.
Bitcoin Version 0.4.0 Released, BITCOIN.ORG (Sept. 23, 2011), http://bitcoin
.org/releases/2011/09/23/v0.4.0.html.
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community’s ability to increase protective measures and ease its
users’ minds.
What is left to be seen is whether Bitcoin’s provision of lower
fees and pseudo-anonymous transactions will be valuable to the
average consumer.172 The digital currency does not need to become
mainstream in order to be successful; it could find plenty of use in
niche markets, such as those that cater to technologists, providers of
digital goods, and participants in virtual worlds.173 It could also
explode in popularity with those planning to use it for nefarious
purposes.174 At this point, then, its fate ultimately rests in the
direction taken by those behind the wheel. For a decentralized
currency like Bitcoin, that means its users.175
IV. ROADS TO REGULATION
Senators Schumer and Manchin’s letter to officials in the
Department of Justice and Drug Enforcement Agency has done
nothing but draw speculation that in the future, Bitcoin will in fact
be subjected to government regulation or, more drastically,
prohibition.176 Even though Bitcoin is not the first digital currency
to be the target of government action,177 many of the challenges it
presents are wholly new. Its distributed nature and lack of corporate
backing means that there is no central database to shut down and no
company officers to hold accountable.178 Because a community of
open source developers maintains its code, if some developers were
to leave the project, through choice or coercion, others would likely
take up the reigns. The issues, however, go much deeper than this.
As many in the Bitcoin community are quick to remind those
participating in discussions on this topic, the United States does not
exercise preeminent control over the medium through which
172. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
173. Surowiecki, supra note 162; Grinberg, supra note 8, at 171–72.
174. Goldstein & Kestenbaum, supra note 89. See discussion supra Part III.A.
175. Goldstein & Kestenbaum, supra note 89.
176. Cheredar, supra note 146; Mike Young, Should Bitcoins Become Illegal
Digital Currency?, ATTORNEY MIKE YOUNG’S INTERNET LAW FIRM,
http://mikeyounglaw.com/bitcoin-digital-currency/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
177. See infra note 214 and accompanying text. The F.B.I. conducted an
investigation into the online currency, Flooz, after they determined that
international criminals were purchasing it using stolen credit cards. This, in
addition to a lack of consumer interest, may have ultimately contributed to its
failure. Bob Tedeschi, E-Commerce Report: Seller of Online Currency May Have
Been Victim of Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com
/2001/08/27/business/e-commerce-report-seller-of-online-currency-may-havebeen-victim-of-fraud.html.
178. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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Bitcoins travel: the Internet itself.179 Because the latter is able to cut
through invisible geographic boundaries, it erodes the traditional
jurisdictional notions upon which laws and their enforcement are
founded.180 As such, in dealing with an inherently elaborate and
distributed system like Bitcoin, there may be no way to exercise
perfect control over it. This does not mean, however, that effective
control is out of the question. Even partial control over the Bitcoin
system could have considerable effects.181
The goal of this Part is to provide insight as to what sort of
regulatory regime would be most effective at addressing the
concerns presented by the Bitcoin system, while also taking into
account the community response they would elicit.182 Three regimes
are evaluated: self-regulation (representing the current state of the
Bitcoin system), intermediary regulation, and prohibition. Each
regime represents a distinct position on a regulatory scale with
respect to the level that it would constrain the use of Bitcoins, and
each entails a different set of benefits and costs.
A. Self-Regulation
For regulating the Internet, many believe that self-regulation is
the most desirable solution.183 That is to say, social norms184 and
market mechanisms should govern the relationships between users

179. fonestar, Comment to Guest Post: What Every Libertarian Should Know
About Bitcoin, ZERO HEDGE (Apr. 1, 2013, 8:45 PM), http://www.zerohedge
.com/news/2013-04-01/guest-post-what-every-libertarian-should-know-aboutbitcoin; John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace
(1996), available at https://projects.eff.org/~barlow /Declaration-Final.html
(asserting that no government exercises sovereign authority over the Internet).
180. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996).
181. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, 73 (2006).
182. For the remainder of this Comment, small-scale criminal activities are
defined as the use of Bitcoins to purchase illegal items of relatively low value
(such as drugs, child pornography, and other black market goods) and its use in
making contributions to criminal organizations. Additionally, large-scale criminal
activities refer to the use of Bitcoins to launder money, evade taxes, or move any
other suspiciously large sums of money.
183. ANG, supra note 91, at 59. See also Barlow, supra note 179.
184. Social norms are the constraints on behavior that are imposed by either
society as a whole or by the members within a specific community. Broadly, they
may be defined as what actions are acceptable and what actions are not acceptable.
Unlike sanctions for violating the law (which come from the State), in the case of
norms, sanctions come from the community itself. Those who fail to abide by their
community’s norms could end up ostracized, filtered, or stigmatized. LESSIG,
supra note 181, at 340–41, 124.
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without the need for state intervention.185 In practice, self-regulation
via norms was sufficient during the Internet’s early days when the
medium was primarily used as a research tool for government
agencies and academic institutions.186 Since then, however, the
Internet’s landscape has transformed into one dominated by
commerce.187 In this new era, some feel that government involvement
is required to enforce the rights of transacting parties.188
The Bitcoin system exemplifies the Internet’s commercial
evolution; indeed, the system is premised on the idea that software
can be designed to address the shortcomings of the market.189
However, Bitcoin’s architectural constraints have, in fact, created
their own problems. In turn, market mechanisms have developed to
provide a solution without state intervention.
More specifically, Bitcoin transactions are practically
irreversible.190 Considering the amount of computing power that
secures them, they are essentially etched in stone. While such
architectural constraints are a boon to honest merchants, inasmuch
as they are protected from the practices of fraudulent buyers, Bitcoin
has no architectural constraints which protect honest buyers from
fraudulent merchants. To provide these consumers with such
protection, reputation systems and escrow services have naturally
developed as a self-regulatory response.191
Reputation systems are an instrument through which legitimate
business practices are enforced. If a merchant defrauds a buyer, then
the buyer can complain about him in a public forum.192 Thus, the
community can punish the merchant by warning others of his
malfeasance and encouraging them to refuse to patronize his
business.193 As a result, merchants are incentivized to protect their
“reputational capital.”194 One such example of this system in
185. Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Optimizing Regulation of Electronic
Commerce, 72 U. CIN. L REV. 1497, 1500–01 (2004). Self-regulation is desirable
because government intervention “tends to be seen as corrupted, self-serving and
cluelessly inefficient.” ANG, supra note 91, at 59.
186. Kesan & Gallo, surpa note 185, at 1501.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
190. See discussion supra Part I.B.2; see also supra note 72.
191. Vitalik Buterin, Webs of Trust and How to Decentralize Them, BITCOIN
WEEKLY (May 20, 2011), http://bitcoinweekly.com/articles/webs-of-trust-andhow-to-decentralize-them. See also, e.g., Fees, supra note 78.
192. Buterin, supra note 191.
193. Id.
194. For an analogue of this system in farming communities, see DOUGLAS W.
ALLEN & DEAN LUECK, THE NATURE OF THE FARM: CONTRACTS, RISK, AND
ORGANIZATION IN AGRICULTURE 37 (2002).
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practice is the Bitcoin Police, a community-run organization whose
function is to identify and prevent scammers in the Bitcoin
economy.195
This mechanism, though, has shortcomings. To be effective, it
requires a small community where information is simple to collect
and disseminate.196 As the Bitcoin economy grows, complete
information becomes harder to obtain and the chance of market
failure increases. Furthermore, reputation systems may only protect
consumers in an aggregate sense. As one of the recent fiascos in the
Bitcoin economy has illustrated, a single incident of fraud can have
particularly catastrophic results.197 This problem is exacerbated
because fraudsters may be able to obfuscate their identities using
Bitcoin.198
Self-regulation could also be capable of preventing large-scale
criminal activities if more Bitcoin exchanges were to employ
“autonomous agents.” Autonomous agents are software programs
able to scan large amounts of financial transactions for irregularities;
potentially, they can even halt a transaction from being processed.199
As such, these agents represent a code-based approach to prevent
the laundering of funds through Bitcoin exchanges. The incentive
for these exchanges in developing and implementing autonomous
agents is that it increases the legitimacy and trustworthiness of their
business; effective laundering-prevention policies ensure that
government authorities are less likely to shut them down and may
even lead to increased business.200 At least one Bitcoin exchange,
CampBX, has already done this.201 In fact, due to the time and
195. MrTiggr, Comment to Welcome to BitcoinPolice.org, BITCOIN POLICE
FORUM (Nov. 16, 2012, 2:01 PM), http://bitcoinpolice.org/t29-WelcomeBitcoinPolice.org.html. The emergence of escrow services also helps to shore up
consumer protection by ensuring that buyers receive the good or service they
bought before their funds are released to the seller. If the escrow service itself
behaves in an irresponsible or unfair manner, it is also subject to having its
reputation tarnished.
196. ALLEN & LUECK, supra note 194, at 37.
197. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (explaining the questionable
circumstances behind the MyBitcoin.com incident).
198. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
199. Richard Jones, Cybercrime and Internet Security: A Criminological
Introduction, in LAW AND THE INTERNET 610 (Lilian Edwards & Charlotte Waelde
eds., 3rd ed. 2009). In a general sense, autonomous agents interact with the data
they encounter and perform certain tasks upon it; they may even be capable of
learning as they go along. Id.
200. Tucker, supra note 21 (noting that digital currencies that take a proactive
approach to prevent fraud are the most popular).
201. This exchange has “hard-coded additional rules in [its] trading engine to
thwart illegitimate usage of the platform.” Frequently Asked Questions, CAMPBX,
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money they have invested in developing this program, they consider
it a competitive advantage.202
The use of these agents by a single Bitcoin exchange is not
representative of the entire industry; more exchanges (in an effort to
be seen as a legitimate) would have to follow in CampBX’s
footsteps. Furthermore, this mechanism also suffers from a lack of
transparency; cooperation between Bitcoin exchanges in setting
standards for how these invisible, code-based regulators operate
would ensure that no single exchange has an exploitable loophole.
In the Bitcoin economy, self-regulation falls short in its inability
to stop small-scale criminal activities. In tinier online communities,
where the group’s interests are cohesive, social norms can govern
effectively, as long as the group has some kind of mechanism in
place to enforce desired behaviors.203 The Bitcoin community,
however, does not. While many within it criticize those who use the
currency to commit crimes, others embrace the libertarian ideals that
the currency represents and have no problem using it for such
purposes.204 Bitcoin is much more than a growing community: it is a
growing economy, representing a diverse collection of interests.205
And because the Bitcoin software provides no way to punish its
users or to stop them from using it criminally, state action will be
necessary to prevent such uses.
An evaluation of self-regulation in the Bitcoin economy shows
that some mechanisms have developed to ensure that consumers are
adequately protected. Furthermore, an increase in the use of
autonomous agents by Bitcoin exchanges would help to reduce the
occurrence of large-scale criminal activities. Admittedly, neither of
these mechanisms is perfect, but they illustrate a drive by at least
some members of the community to ensure that the economy is seen
as legitimate. Where self-regulation fails outright, however, is with
respect to small-scale criminal activities. The community itself
https://campbx.com/faq.php (last visited Oct. 11, 2011) (located in the section
labeled “Legal Compliance”).
202. E-mail from Keyur, CampBX employee, CampBX, to author (Oct. 2,
2011, 1:03 AM) (on file with author).
203. Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1257, 1270 (1998).
204. Chen, supra note 77. Compare, e.g., Trade, supra note 135 (which bans
the public listing of any illegal products or services), with Vince, Maintaining
Anonymity While Using Bitcoin, THE MONETARY FUTURE (Jun. 16, 2011),
http://themonetaryfuture.blogspot.com/2011/07/maintaining-anonymity-while-using
.html (instructing users on the steps they can take to maintain greater anonymity,
beyond that of what Bitcoin provides by default, in the event they plan on using the
currency to purchase drugs from Silk Road).
205. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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possesses no discernable means to punish wrongdoers, and it is
likely that state action is required.
B. Regulation of Market Participants
Currently, the vast majority of activity in the Bitcoin economy
involves the movement of funds by investors, speculators, and
traders through Bitcoin exchanges.206 By facilitating the conversion
of Bitcoins to and from more established (and stable) currencies,
they are indispensable entities to the functioning of the Bitcoin
economy. That is, they could best be described as valves through
which the illicit earnings of any major criminal enterprise must flow.
Thus, these exchanges represent a logical place to begin
implementing mechanisms designed to prevent large-scale criminal
activities from taking place using the currency.
In fact, these exchanges may already fall into an existing
regulatory scheme—one that governs the operation of certain
financial institutions known as “money service businesses.” These
businesses cash checks, deal in foreign exchange, and provide
prepaid access or money transmission services.207 Bitcoin exchanges
would probably be categorized as the latter. Money transmitters
accept “currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency”
and transmit it “to another location or person by any means.”208
Additionally, an entity may be classified as a money transmitter
based on the specific facts and circumstances that surround the
operation of its business.209
The definition of money transmitter was revised in 2011. The
previous version was more limited, which led to some ambiguity as
to where digital currency exchanges would fit into these
regulations.210 For example, an exchange might have raised the
defense that private currencies do not actually qualify as “funds.”211
206. Paul Krugman – Golden Cyberfetters [Op-Ed on Bitcoin], BITCOIN
MONEY (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.bitcoinmoney.com/post/9913036774/paulkrugman-bitcoin-op-ed. See discussion supra Part III.A.
207. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff) (2011). Money service businesses need not
actually be “organized or licensed business concern[s].” Id.
208. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A) (2011).
209. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(ii) (2011).
210. William Hett, Digital Currencies and the Financing of Terrorism, 15
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4, 24 (2008). Before the revision, a money transmitter was an
entity “who engages as a business in accepting currency, or funds denominated in
currency, and transmits the currency or funds, or the value of the currency or
funds, by any means . . . .” 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(uu)(5)(A) (2010).
211. Tucker, supra note 21, at 610. The regulation’s definition of currency
does not encompass digital currencies, as the term is limited to that which is legal
tender in the United States or in foreign nations. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(m) (2011).
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Regardless of the merits of such an argument, the inclusion of
“value that substitutes for currency” is sure to foreclose any doubt
whether Bitcoin exchanges are covered under the revised
regulations.212
Under these regulations (and the federal statutes they crossreference), if Bitcoin exchanges were indeed categorized as money
transmitters, they would have to comply with a number of rules
governing their operation.213 First, operators of these businesses are
required to register with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(also known as FinCEN, a division of the Department of the
Treasury).214 They must also compile “certain reports or records
[that] have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory
investigations”215 in addition to developing and implementing
effective anti-money-laundering programs.216 Finally, under the
provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, these financial institutions
would also be required to verify and maintain records on the
identities of their customers.217
There are two major advantages to ensuring that Bitcoin
exchanges comply with these regulations. The first is that the rules
are preexisting; in other words, no additional legislative effort is
required to devise a wholly new, Bitcoin-specific framework to
govern the operation of these entities. Second, the reporting
standards the regulations call for were precisely designed to inhibit
212. Additionally, before the revision, businesses that would otherwise qualify
as money transmitters were exempted if their “acceptance and transmission of
funds [was] an integral part of the execution and settlement of a transaction other
than the funds transmission itself (for example, in connection with a bona fide sale
of securities or other property).” 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(uu)(5)(B)(ii) (2010). If
Bitcoins were to be classified as securities instead of as a currency, see, e.g.,
Grinberg, supra note 8, at 194–99 (discussing the merits of such a classification),
exchanges would have been exempted under this provision. However, the
exemption now applies only if the money transmitter “[a]ccepts and transmits
funds only integral to the sale of goods or the provision of services.” 31 C.F.R. §
1010.100(ff)(5)(ii)(F) (2011).
213. Tucker, supra note 21, at 611–12; see also 31 C.F.R. § 1022.200 (2012).
214. 31 U.S.C. § 5330(a) (2006); 31 C.F.R. § 1022.380(a) (2011). These
businesses must also be licensed under state law, where it is required. Failure to
comply with registration and licensing requirements can result in criminal
sanctions. 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2006). See, e.g., United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 550 F.
Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 2008) (digital currency provider was a “money transmitting
business,” because the definition was not limited to only businesses that engaged
in actual cash transmissions).
215. 31 U.S.C. § 5311.
216. These programs “shall include provisions for . . . (A) Verifying customer
identification . . . (B) Filing Reports; (C) Creating and retaining records; [and] (D)
Responding to law enforcement requests.” 31 C.F.R. § 1022.210 (2011).
217. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(l); Hett, supra note 210, at 27.
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criminals from funneling their proceeds through these types of
nonbank financial institutions. As such, the regulations would need no
further alteration to achieve their purpose in the context of the Bitcoin
economy. Thus, a definitive administrative ruling by the Treasury
Department—clarifying the application of these requirements to
Bitcoin exchanges and stating their intent to enforce compliance—
may be all that is additionally necessary.218
The drawback to relying on these regulations, however, comes
in the form of the limited jurisdiction of the United States. That is,
measures such as this will only be effective if they are enforced on
an international scale by cooperating nations.219 Many exchanges
are located abroad and would probably prefer not to undertake the
substantial costs associated with registration and compliance.220
Criminal enterprises, then, could utilize these noncompliant
exchanges to increase the chance that their activities would escape
governmental scrutiny.
In sum, the regulations governing the operation of money
service businesses provide an existing framework for stymieing
large-scale criminal activities in the Bitcoin economy. However,
without enforcement abroad, they may only prove to be effective at
the domestic level. Furthermore, casual transactions for contraband
items would likely continue to go unnoticed.
C. Prohibition
A prohibition on the use of Bitcoins would not be unheard of.
Lawmakers have, in fact, banned the use of certain technologies in the
past. For example, provisions in the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act criminalize the dissemination of any technology whose primary
purpose is to circumvent digital copyright protections.221 Prohibitive
measures, however, are typically not taken unless the technology’s
harms greatly outweigh the societal benefits from its use.222 In such

218. Notably, in an effort to ensure that Bitcoin continues to be seen as
legitimate, some exchanges have taken a proactive approach to comply with these
regulations, including Mt. Gox and CampBX. Wolf, supra note 158; Frequently
Asked Questions, supra note 201.
219. Tucker, supra note 21, at 617.
220. Even if the costs of doing so were negligible, it is likely that some
exchanges would refuse to comply specifically because they cater to customers
who use Bitcoin to engage in criminal activities.
221. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)–(b) (2006).
222. Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
319, 328 (2005).

1150

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

circumstances, lawmakers tend to view prohibition as the most
efficient solution.223
In Sony v. Universal City Studios, the Supreme Court was faced
with deciding whether Sony, producer of the Betamax home video
recorder, could be held liable for contributing to the copyright
infringing activities of its customers.224 In resolving the case in favor
of Sony, the Court determined that the Betamax was “capable of
substantial noninfringing uses” and, additionally, that there was no
evidence that Sony encouraged infringing behavior.225
Admittedly, Bitcoin has nothing to do with copyright
infringement. Sony, however, provides a useful analogy of how
regulators might view the Bitcoin system: prohibitive measures will
not likely be taken against the digital currency unless lawmakers
find that it is being used almost exclusively for illicit purposes.226 In
other words, if average consumers were unimpressed by Bitcoin’s
advantages and its economy was devoid of any lawful activity, a
prohibition might make sense.
A ban on Bitcoin’s use could also result if it was able to
sufficiently challenge the U.S. dollar.227 Some scholars have
suggested that lawmakers might respond with hostility to successful
digital currencies because they could eventually undermine the
government’s seignorage income228 and decrease the value of the
nation’s currency (if individuals preferred the digital currency to the
national one).229
While many, if not all, of these reasons supporting prohibitive
measures are valid, they are not valid yet. At this point, there are still
too many legitimate actors in the Bitcoin economy to conclude, as
Senator Schumer has, that Bitcoin is nothing other than “an online
223. Id.
224. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
225. Id. at 438.
226. Goldstein & Kestenbaum, supra note 89 (quoting Columbia Law School
Professor Ronald Mann, who intimates that regulators will likely evaluate what
Bitcoin is primarily used for when calculating how they should respond). Bitcoin’s
architecture could escalate such a finding because experts have stated that the most
dangerous features of some digital currencies is not their ability to provide
anonymity, but the irrevocable nature of their transactions. That is, criminals are
less concerned with the traceability of their actions and seem to care more about
frustrating the possibility of funds recovery. Ross Anderson, Closing the Phishing
Hole – Fraud, Risk, and Nonbanks, CAMBRIDGE UNIV., 1 (Apr. 8, 2007),
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/nonbanks.pdf.
227. See discussion supra Part II.B.
228. Seignorage is the “revenue a government receives by issuing money.”
MISHKIN, supra note 29, at G-9.
229. Tucker, supra note 21, at 620; Friedman & Macintosh, supra note 36, at
279.
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form of money laundering.”230 Furthermore, the Bitcoin economy is
still too small to warrant concern that it could lead to overall
economic instability. As governmental financial authorities have
pointed out, “even if every person in the United States held $150 in
electronic currency, the total value would amount to less than $50
billion, which is insignificant relative to the current M1 monetary
aggregate of $1 trillion.”231
Prohibitions also tend to be “economically inefficient means of
regulation” for three primary reasons.232 First, they eliminate any
potential benefit conferred by the banned technology.233 Second,
they tend to stymie any future innovation that could have resulted
from the technology’s continued use.234 Finally, they entail high
costs with respect to enforcement.235
These arguments against prohibition also resonate strongly with
Bitcoin. A proscription on the digital currency’s use would
concomitantly eliminate the financial advantages and convenience it
provides to consumers and merchants. Passing a law banning the use
of the digital currency would also foreclose the future advances it
could bring as it continues to upend the traditional paradigm of
Internet commerce.236 Indeed, its novel approach to transaction
verification has led to the development of other innovative projects,
which would not have been possible in Bitcoin’s absence.237
The effects of such a law would do little more than stop the
majority of law-abiding individuals from using the digital currency
out of the fear of prosecution, while “Bitcoin criminals” would not
likely be deterred because they were already engaging in illegal
activities. Fundamentally, this is the same problem that has troubled
the entertainment industry for nearly a decade.238 Despite the
panoply of (expensive) lawsuits that the industry has filed in an
230. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
231. Grinberg, supra note 8, at 182 n.97 (citing Edward W. Kelley, Jr.,
Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Remarks at the
Digital Commerce Conference 4 (May 6, 1996)). M1 is one of the measures of the
money supply used by the Federal Reserve; it includes the total value of currency,
traveler’s checks, and demand deposits. MISHKIN, supra note 29, at 57.
232. Kesan & Shah, supra note 222, at 328.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
237. See, e.g., Namecoin, an alternative domain name system based on
Bitcoin’s source code. Namecoin – A DNS Alternative Based on Bitcoin, BLUISH
CODER (May 12, 2011), http://www.bluishcoder.co.nz/2011/05/12/namecoin-adns-alternative-based-on-bitcoin.html.
238. RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION (Sept. 2008), https://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-years-later.
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attempt to combat peer-to-peer file sharing, illegal downloading has
only become more popular.239 This analogy may be exceptionally
appropriate because the architecture behind the Bitcoin system is not
all that different from that which powers the BitTorrent file-sharing
software.240 While regulators could attempt to halt the flow of
Bitcoins by requiring Internet Service Providers to block the digital
currency’s transactions, sophisticated Bitcoin users could easily
respond by recalibrating the Bitcoin software to evade this
technological roadblock.241
Considering these factors, prohibiting Bitcoin in the near future
would be a rash and unnecessary response to issues that have not yet
fully materialized. While the approach may ultimately protect
consumers by removing them from the system altogether, it would
probably not affect the behavior of individuals persistent in using
the digital currency for both small and large-scale criminal activities.
CONCLUSION
In theory, the ideas that prompted the development of the
Bitcoin system are sound. It is the first digital currency to solve the
double-spending problem without having to introduce a third party.
This reduces transaction costs for both consumers and merchants
and protects Bitcoin users from having to share their transactional
history with financial institutions. Furthermore, Bitcoin’s selfadministered money supply eliminates the need for a central
authority, which could protect it from both inflation and political
influence.242
While the system certainly presents opportunities for criminal
abuse that cannot be ignored,243 the digital currency is still too much
in its infancy to have proven that its economic model is sustainable
and, thus, that its facilitation of illicit activities is likely to
239. Id.
240. J.P., supra note 46. BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer protocol that allows users
to share files with one another without the need for a centralized server.
BitTorrent, TECHNOPEDIA, http://www.techopedia.com/definition/1865/bittorrent
(last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
241. Traditionally, the entertainment industry has looked to ISPs as
“chokepoints” through which the dissemination of illegally copied files could be
throttled. As would be the case with Bitcoin, this task would be accomplished by
the use of port scrutiny or deep packet inspection. A governmental mandate to
employ such measures, however, would undoubtedly raise substantial privacy
concerns. Lilian Edwards, The Fall and Rise of Intermediary Liability Online, in
LAW AND THE INTERNET, supra note 199, at 81; Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of
Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1492, 1468 (2009).
242. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
243. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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continue.244 Moreover, the Bitcoin system has provided a novel
method of value exchange that could potentially serve as the
foundation of further innovations. Any regulatory response, then,
should initially be limited and carefully measured.
Prohibition is not the answer. Owing to Bitcoin’s distributed
nature, even if prohibition eventually proves to be a logical choice, it
would likely never come close to addressing the problems for which
it was enacted.245 More importantly though, hand-to-hand cash
transactions are used just as frequently for criminal purposes, yet the
efforts of lawmakers and law enforcement agencies are directed at
the criminals themselves and not at the medium through which they
transact. Indeed, Bitcoin’s blockchain provides a record of all
transactions that take place on the network.246 Through the use of
“sophisticated network analysis techniques,”247 law enforcement
agencies may be able to leverage this public ledger to ferret out any
small-scale criminal actors using the digital currency for nefarious
purposes.
In terms of large-scale criminal activities, government efforts
should be directed at the exchanges that operate in the Bitcoin
economy. The recent revision to the regulatory definitions and
requirements of money service businesses seems to eliminate any
doubt as to whether Bitcoin exchanges fall within the scope of these
provisions. In fact, the requirements were designed to combat the
same large-scale criminal activities that have been identified as a
major concern in the Bitcoin economy. While ensuring that these
exchanges comply with the existing statutory scheme may only
achieve the desired result on a domestic level, until the direction of
the Bitcoin economy is more fully realized, it represents the best
solution going forward.248
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